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NOTES
DETERMINING A STANDARD OF CAUSATION FOR
DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGES UNDER
SECTION 8(a)(3) OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 8(a)(3)1 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2 pro-
hibits discrimination3 in employment decisions on the basis of union
membership or activity, encouraging employees to freely exercise their
right to join unions without imperiling their livelihood.4 The Act, how-
ever, does not interfere with management's right to discharge employ-
ees for legitimate business reasons.-
The most recurrent problem 6 presented to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board is determining whether an employer's discharge decision is
motivated by valid business reasons or anti-union animus.7 Resolution
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer... by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976).
3. Neither the NLRA nor its legislative history contains a definition of "discrimination."
The Supreme Court has not defined the word in the context of § 8(a)(3) unfair labor practices
either. For an excellent analysis of the meaning of "discrimination" in the NLRA, see Shieber,
Section 8(a)(3) ofthe National Labor Relations Act;A Rationale: Part L Discrimination, 29 LA. L.
REv. 46 (1968). See also note 20 infra.
4. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,40 (1954); Waterbury Community Antenna,
Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local
338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1163 (2d Cir. 1976).
5. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965); NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 347 (1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46
(1937); Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1978); NLRB v.
Advanced Business Forms Corp., 474 F.2d 457, 464 (2d Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Dorn's Transp. Co.,
405 F.2d 706, 712 (2d Cir. 1969).
6. "We receive far too many discriminatory discharge cases-well over half of all charges
filed against employers-and charges against employers constitute over two-thirds of all charges
filed." 52 N.Y.S.B.J. 184 (April 1980) (address by NLRB Chairman John H. Fanning). In 1980,
the Board's caseload approached the 50,000 mark. Id Consistently, nearly two-thirds of all
charges against employers, totalling approximately 22,000 cases in 1980, involve allegations of
discriminatory discharges. 42 NLRB ANN. REP. 11 (1977); 41 NLRB ANN. RaE. 11 (1976); 40
NLRB ANN. REP. 9 (1975); 34 NLRB ANN. REP. 199 (1969).
7. See Shieber & Moore, Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act: A Rationale,
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of such cases turns on proof of discriminatory intent or motivation.$
The Board must determine whether there is a causal relationship when
an employee who engaged in union or other protected activities is sub-
jected to employer action that detrimentally affects the employee's job.9
The employer commits an unfair labor practice under the Act if the
General Counsel1 ° demonstrates that the actuating motive was reprisal
for the employee's union membership or activity. l1
Although the General Counsel is not required to show that union
activities were the sole actuating cause for the discharge or lesser disci-
pline,12 broad disagreement exists over the quantum of employer ani-
mus necessary to find an unfair labor practice. 13 Consequently, courts
and the Board have employed various "tests" when deciding dual mo-
tive cases. 4 Some courts find a violation if employer discipline was
precipitated "in part" by the employee's union activity, even though
the action was taken "in part" for significant business reasons.' 5 Other
Part!!, 33 LA. L. REv. 1, 37-42 (1972), in which the authors suggest definitions of motive that can
be used in two distinct senses to clarify the significance of employer anti-union animus in § 8(a)(3)
cases.
8. Apparently the terms "motive" and "intent," although distinguishable under some cir-
cumstances, are used synonymously by both the NLRB and the courts. See Christensen & Sva-
noe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices, 77 YAL L.J. 1269, 1271 n.4
(1968). But see Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the LaborAct: of Balanc-
ing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491 (1967) (motive and intent each stand
for distinguishable concepts and should be employed as such).
9. See Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Wright Line].
10. The General Counsel's office was established to handle the Board's unfair labor practice
prosecutorial functions. The General Counsel, appointed by the President and approved by the
Senate, is responsible for representing the NLRB in the courts. Because the General Counsel's
discretion is unreviewable, many believe him to be the most powerful individual in the labor
relations field. For the statutory authority of the General Counsel, see 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976).
11. See R. GORmAN, LABOR LAW 137 (1977).
12. Id at 138.
13. Compare, eg., NLRB v. Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1312 (1st Cir. 1971) (improper
motive must be dominant) with S.A. Healy Co. v. NLRB, 435 F.2d 314, 316 (10th Cir. 1970)
(improper motive must have contributed in some part) and NLRB v. United Brass Works, Inc.,
287 F.2d 689, 693-94 (4th Cir. 1961) (there must be a reasonable explanation for the discrimina-
tory motive).
14. See, e-g., Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980). These causation tests are analyzed in
§ IV ikfta.
15. "In part" language has been employed by every circuit court of appeals except the first
and the ninth. See, eg., Second Circuit: NLRB v. Midtown Service Co., 425 F.2d 665, 670 (2d
Cir. 1970); Third Circuit: NLRB v. Eagle Material Handling, Inc., 558 F.2d 160, 169 (3d Cir.
1977); Fourth Circuit: Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir. 1977);
Fifth Circuit: Sweeney & Co. v. NLRB, 437 F.2d 1127, 1133 (5th Cir. 1971); Sixth Circuit: NLRB
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/12
Number 3] DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGES
courts require the improper motive to be "dominant."1 6
This Note contends that the motive test announced by the Supreme
Court in Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle,17 a related first
amendment case,' 8 provides the proper balance between the employer's
management prerogatives and the employee's right to protection from
discrimination attributable to organizational activity. The Note argues
that the Mt. Healthy test is mandated by the legislative history of the
NLRA, as well as pertinent Supreme Court decisions. Finally, this
Note concludes that a shifting burden of proof must be applied in dual
motive cases to insure that the competing interests inherent in dual mo-
tivation cases are resolved in accord with the policies and objectives of
NLRA section 8(a)(3).
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND ELEMENTS OF THE
PRIMA FACIE CASE
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that it
is an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or discourage
membership in a labor organization through discrimination pertaining
to hire or tenure of employment.' 9 A basic violation of this section
consists of three elements: the employer's action must constitute "dis-
crimination,"2 it must occur in the area of "hire, tenure of employment
v. Adam Loos Boiler Works Co., 435 F.2d 707, 707 (6th Cir. 1970); Seventh Circuit: Nacker
Packing Co. v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 456,459-60 (7th Cir. 1980); Eighth Circuit: Singer Co. v. NLRB,
429 F.2d 172, 179 (8th Cir. 1970); Tenth Circuit: M.S.P. Indus. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 166, 168 (10th
Cir. 1977); District of Columbia Circuit: Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See
also Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 224 N.L.R.B. 574, 92 L.R.R.M. 1328, 1329 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Colletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292, 1293 (Ist Cir. 1977); Famet,
Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 293, 296 (9th Cir. 1973).
17. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
18. The plaintiff in Mt. Healthy alleged that his discharge from employment as a public
school teacher was discriminatorily motivated in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments.
See notes 112-20 infra and accompanying text.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). In a complementary restriction, § 8(b)(2) forbids a union
"to cause or attempt to cause" an employer to violate § 8(a)(3) or to discriminate against an em-
ployee whose nonmembership results from any factor other than failure to pay dues and initiation
fees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976). Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees the right to partici-
pate in labor organizations and "other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). This "declaration of employee rights"
is enforced through the unfair labor practices in § 8.
20. Much uncertainty exists about the meaning of the word "discrimination" for purposes of
finding an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3). See note 3 supra. The word is sometimes used to
refer to an employer's adverse treatment of employees, whether or not caused by employee exer-
cise of rights protected under § 7 of the Act. Some authorities, however, hold that only treatment
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or any term or condition of employment," 21 and it must be "to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor organization. '22
Congress had two reasons for enacting section 8(a)(3).3 First, Con-
gress wanted to prevent employers from interfering with employees'
rights to organize and choose representatives. Second, it wanted to
avoid undue restriction of employers' control over their enterprises. 24
Thus, the Act does not affect the right of an employer to discharge an
employee without reason or for nondiscriminatory reasons.25  Only
those discharges having the purpose and effect of encouraging or dis-
couraging union membership or activity are unlawful.26
The NLRB has primary responsibility to strike a proper balance be-
tween an employer's asserted business justifications and invasion of
employee rights.27 Distinguishing dual motive cases from "pretext"
caused by exercise of § 7 rights is "discrimination." A finding of discrimination sometimes re-
quires employers to differentiate their treatment of employees or base their conduct on arbitrary
reasons involving exercise of § 7 rights. See Shieber, supra note 3, at 48, 51-52. Shieber believes
that discrimination is any change in employment conditions caused by the exercise by employees
of§ 7 rights. Further, Shieber concludes that employer treatment of employees need not be differ-
ential. Therefore, Shieber would allow a finding of § 8(a)(3) discrimination even if the employer
treats all employees identically, as long as the employer's conduct is prompted by the exercise of
§ 7 rights. Id at 54-55, 76-77.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
22. Id
23. See discussion of § 8(a)(3) in H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1935), re-
printed in 11 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 3046, 3069 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The House Report states:
Nothing in this subsection prohibits [sic, permits?] interference with the normal exercise
of the right of employers to select their employees or to discharge them. All that is
intended is that the employer shall not by discriminatory treatment in hire or tenure of
employment or terms or conditions of employment, interfere with the exercise by em-
ployees of their right to organize and choose representatives. It is for this reason that the
employer is prohibited from encouraging or discouraging membership in any labor or-
ganization by such discrimination.
Id
24. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), in which the Supreme
Court stated that "[W]e have consistently construed the section to leave unscathed a wide range of
employer actions taken to serve legitimate business interests in some significant fashion, even
though the act committed may tend to discourage union membership." Id at 311. This construc-
tion of§ 8(a)(3) is essential if the employer's right to manage his enterprise is accorded protection.
Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
25. Typically, courts of appeals state that "management is free to discharge employees for
good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all." See, e.g., NLRB v. Computed Time Corp., 587 F.2d
790, 795 (5th Cir. 1979).
26. See, e.g., American Thread Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 1980); Waterbury
Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1978).
27. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., Inc., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967), quoting NLRB v. Great
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cases is an important part of this task. Dual motive cases occur when
the discipline decision involves legitimate business reasons as well as
discriminatory considerations.28 In pretext cases, by contrast, the em-
ployer fails to set forth legitimate business reasons for disciplining an
employee.29  Because no valid justification for the discipline exists,
there is no dual motive.31 Inferences31 of unlawful employer motiva-
tion must, however, be supported by substantial evidence.32
When establishing a prima facie 8(a)(3) case, the most important fac-
tual component the General Counsel must prove is employer knowl-
edge of the disciplined employee's union activities. 33 Knowledge
provides the basis from which unlawful intent may be inferred.34 Be-
Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967). See also Texas Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d
1067, 1073 (1st Cir. 1979).
28. Address by former NLRB member John C. Truesdale, October 3, 1980, at Columbia,
Missouri, 105 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 146 (October 20, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Truesdale
address].
29. In modem day labor relations an employer will rarely, if ever, baldly assert that it has
disciplined an employee because of disdain for protected activities. Instead, the employer will
advance what it considers a legitimate business reason for its action. The evidence may reveal,
however, that the asserted justification is a sham because the purported rule or circumstance ad-
vanced by the employer did not exist or was not relied on. When this occurs, the employer's
reason is pretextual. See Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 97-98 (2d
Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Lizdale Knitting Mills, Inc., 523 F.2d 978, 980 (2d Cir. 1975); NLRB v.
Teamsters Local 294, 470 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1972). See also notes 76, 133 infra.
30. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083-84 & n.5 (1980).
31. Because direct evidence of an employer's improper motive is difficult to establish, the
Board may infer intent from the surrounding circumstances. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 592
F.2d 595, 603 (1st Cir. 1979); NLRB v. South Shore Hosp., 571 F.2d 677, 682 (1st Cir. 1978). See
generally Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 532, 540 (1962).
32. The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolo v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
229 (1938). Substantial evidence must have rational probative force; it requires more than a scin-
tilla of evidence and must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be
established. An unlawful purpose is not lightly inferred. Substantial evidence is not satisfied by
evidence that gives equal weight to inconsistent inferences. See American Thread Co. v. NLRB,
631 F.2d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 1980); Sioux Quality Packers v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir.
1978); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245, 1256-60 (5th Cir. 1978); Independent
Gravel Co. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 1977). See generally Salm, The Dischargefor
Union Altirties, 12 LAB. L.J. 325, 328-29 (1961).
33. Knowledge of lack of union activities may also be important when the employer is ille-
gally encouraging participation in a company favored union.
34. Obviously, if the employer is without knowledge of union activity, he presumably must
have taken the alleged action against the employee for some other reason. See NLRB v. Atlanta
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 293 F.2d 300, 309 (5th Cir. 1961). See also NLRB v. Whitin Mach.
Works, 204 F.2d 883 (lst Cir. 1953). The knowledge requirement was directly addressed in Bulk
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cause the prohibition against discharge proscribes only terminations
that are performed with the specific purpose and intent,35 an employer
does not commit an unfair labor practice unless hostility toward union
activity is proven.36 The Board has found that the following factors
show an intent to encourage or discourage union membership or activ-
ity: Discharge immediately after discovery of union activity; 37 violent
Haulers, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 389 (1972), in which the Board dismissed the complaint. The em-
ployer had previously demonstrated anti-union animus and knew that an organizational cam-
paign was underway. A truck driver who was an active union organizer was allegedly fired for his
habitual tardiness in making liquor pickups. Without reaching the employer's proffered business
justification, the Trial Examiner stated, with the Board's subsequent approval, that the General
Counsel's failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer was aware of the
employee's union activity failed to make out a prima fade case. It was therefore unnecessary to
evaluate whether the discharge was for good cause. Id at 11.
35. See notes 1, 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
36. Proof of hostile motivation can be inferred as well. See note 31 supra. The burden of
proof in § 8(a)(3) cases is on the moving party, i.e., the General Counsel. See American Thread
Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 316, 320-21 (4th Cir. 1980); McLean Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d
1168, 1169-70 (4th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Adams Delivery Service, Inc., 623 F.2d 96, 98-99 (9th Cir.
1980); L'Eggs Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1980); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 595, 601 (1st Cir. 1979); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335,
1337-38 (4th Cir. 1976).
The quantum of proof required is that unfair labor practice findings be based on a "preponder-
ance of the testimony" standard, as required by the amendment to § 10(c). Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, § 10(c) (amending National Labor Relations Act § 10(c)), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1976). Under the Wagner Act, the Board's findings could be based on the virtually
unreviewable "weight of the evidence" standard. The amendment requires the Board to identify
the evidence relied on, instead of simply resting its decision on all the evidence presented. "Expert
inferences" drawn by the Board will no longer be upheld unless supported by a preponderance of
the testimony. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT (LMRA) OF 1947, at 505, 557-60
(1947) [hereinafter cited as 1947 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The § 10(c) requirement that unfair
labor practice findings be supported by a preponderance of the testimony was reinforced by Con-
gress' simultaneous amendment of § 10(e) substituting the more stringent "substantial evidence"
review standard for the existing "supported by evidence" standard. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS AcT OF 1947, § 10(e) (amending NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT § 10(c)), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e) (1976). The amendment to § 10(e) was enacted to give courts "a real power of review" to
insure that Board decisions are reached in accord with the stiffer burden of proof. H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1947), reprinted in 1947 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 505, 560.
See also DuRoss, Toward Rationality in Discririnatory Discharge Cases: The Impact of Mt.
Healthy Bd ofEducation Upon the NLAA, 66 GEO. L.J. 1109, 1124 (1978).
37. Advance Watch Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1980) (discharge of employee immediately after
he asked employer why company was without a union unlawful); Saloon, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No.
156 (Feb. 14, 1980) (discharge of bartender shortly after showing of union support unlawful);
Hansen Cakes, 242 N.L.R.B. 472 (1979) (discharge of cake decorator one day after union organi-
zational meeting unlawful); Huttig Sash & Door Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 571 (1978) (employer unlaw-
fully discharged leading union adherent three days after receiving a letter from a union claiming a
majority and demanding recognition); Galar Indus. Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 28 (1978) (abrupt discharge
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anti-union background as evidenced by past history of employer inter-
ference, restraint, and coercion;38 disregard of seniority;39 threats of
disciplinary action or shutdown if unionization develops; 0 surveillance
of union activities prior to discharge;41 expressed satisfaction with work
of discharged union members;42 and shutdown of operations or sub-
contracting of work.43
Although an employer has knowledge of a worker's union activity,
of union activists after union campaign undertaken unlawful); Lighting Systems Co., 238
N.L.R.B. 108 (1978) (employer unlawfully discharged three employees for signing union cards
and meeting with union representatives on first work day after employees met with union repre-
sentatives); Midland Glass Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 547 (1974) (discharge of employee one hour after
supervisor of union job unlawful); Sam & Margaret Foods, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 423 (1974) (dis-
charge of union activists on same day as organizational meeting unlawful); Reeve Brothers, Inc.,
Eagle & Phenix Division, 207 N.L.R.B. 51 (1978) (discharge of union adherent 24 hours after
posting union leaflet unlawful).
38. Agri-Seeds, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 911 (1978) (employer's statement showed anti-union ani-
mus caused discharge); Florida Steel Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. 371 (1975), enforcedin perlinentpart, 80
Lab. Cas. 111,865 (4th Cir. 1977) (employer had discharge background of hostility to pro union
blacks); Act Tool Engineering, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 104 (1974) (background of union hostility
showed discriminatory motivation); McElrath Poultry Co., Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 354 (1973) (animus
shown by questions and timing of discharges).
39. Intercontinental Mfg. Co., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 694 (1973) (company manipulation of sen-
iority showed employee discharged unlawfully); Sachs & Sons, 135 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1962) (dis-
charge of union employee recently involved in union incidents while employees with less seniority
retained was unfair labor practice).
40. C & 0 Motors, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1973) (discharges following unlawful threats and
interrogation held unlawful); Mid-South Towing Co., 177 N.L.RB. 964 (1969) (discriminatory
motive for discharge evidenced by employer threat to discharge employee because of union activ-
ity), enforcedper curiam, 436 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1971); Iowa Mold Tooling Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1011
(1968) (employer's statement that he was going to get union out of plant and would run over
anyone who got in way showed discriminatory motive for discharge).
41. NLRB v. Citizens Hotel Co., 313 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1963) (employer guilty of unlawful
discrimination by sending spy to union meeting and later discharging employees who revealed an
interest in union activity); Bakersfield Foods Co., Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 1130 (1959) (same).
42. Wadco Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 207 (1978) (discharge for insubordination unlawful because
pretextual); J.D.B., Inc. 223 N.L.R.B. 1163 (1976) (unionist with good work record dis-
criminatorily fired); Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, 188 N.L.R.B. 784 (1971), enforced, 466 F.2d 971
(9th Cir. 1972) (precipitous discharge after overhearing employee's remark unlawful).
43. Tucker Enterprises, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 1188 (1978) (employer engaged in unlawful dis-
crimination when it closes its stores and discharges all employees for union activities); Bedford
Cut Stone Co., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 629 (1978) (refusal to reemploy two employees upon reopening
plant because of union membership and protected activity unlawful); Mobile Home Expo, Inc.,
198 N.L.R.B. 1188 (1972) (illegal discharge of employees prior to employer commencement of
subcontracting directly followed union petition); Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547 (1961)
(employer unlawfully discharged employees by shutting down plant and moving operations to
remote locality when done in order to force bargaining concessions from union), enforced sub.
non Garment Workers, Philadelphia Dress Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1962).
Washington University Open Scholarship
920 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:913
he does not violate the Act by discharging an employee unless there is
proof that the employer had an opportunity to and did in fact discrimi-
nate.4" Excluding several well-defined exceptions, 45 a number of em-
ployer actions--discharging a union member for wearing union
insignia,46 leaving work to attend a union meeting,47 or expressing dis-
satisfaction with negotiations48 -are routinely pronounced unfair labor
practices.
In most cases involving claims of discriminatory discharge, employ-
ers offer the defense that business considerations prompted the termi-
nation.49 Although employers retain the basic right to discharge an
employee for just cause or no cause at all,50 proof of a nondiscrimina-
tory motive for discharge is necessary to dispel an inference that the
discharge was actually motivated by anti-union sentiment.5' Valid
grounds for discharging an employee include a decline in business,52
44. NLRB v. Collier, 553 F.2d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 1977).
45. For example, an employer may lawfully discharge employees for circulating handbills
attacking his products, even though the purpose of engaging in the activity is to enforce the
union's bargaining demands. NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
46. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (discharges for wearing union
insignia improper); NLRB v. Mayrath Co., 317 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1963) (employer guilty of un-
lawful discrimination if he discharges or lays off employee for wearing union insignia); NLRB v.
Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, Inc., 293 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1961) (discharge for participation in organi-
zational activities unlawful); NLRB v. Howell Chevrolet Co., 204 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1953) (dis-
charge of shop steward who wore special union button unlawful); Knickerbocker Plastics Co., 96
N.L.R.B. 586 (1951) (discharge of union adherent who wore union button in plant on day follow-
ing NLRB election was discriminatory).
47. NLRB v. Cambria Clay Prods. Co., 215 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1954) (employees improperly
discharged for attending union meeting); Greif Bros. Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. 240 (1978) (cannot fire
employee for attending union conference without permission).
48. United States Metals Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 841 (1975) (employer unlawfully discharged em-
ployee for trying to distribute a leaflet urging workers to reject a contract proposed by the union
and employer); United States Aluminum Corp., 141 N.L.R.B. 1079 (1963) (cannot discharge em-
ployee for trying to get union to take firmer stand with employer in contract negotiations).
49. See [1977] 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 4065.
50. NLRB v. MaGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956); Klate Holt Co., 161 N.L.R.B.
1606, 1612 (1966).
51. For example, an employer can prove nondiscriminatory motive by proving discharges
took place due to a slack period of production. See [1977] 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 4095.
52. Leonardo Truck Lines, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1978) (truck driver lawfully laid off be-
cause of slow work and not because of demonstrated union sympathies); Charles Edwin Laffey,
223 N.L.R.B. 845 (1976) (95% reduction in employer's work justified layoff of workers during
union campaign); Successful Creation, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 561 (1975) (employee lawfully termi-
nated as part of company layoff due to declining business, not for wearing union buttons); Zim
Textile Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. 269 (1975) (layoff after decline in employer's business justified), en-
forced, 535 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1976); Monzia, Ltd., 197 N.L.R.B. 697 (1972) (layoffs motivated by
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employee misconduct," poor workmanship, 54 dishonesty,5 absentee-
ism,56 and breach of company rules.57
III. SECTION 8(a)(3), MOTIVE, AND THE SUPREME COURT
Although motivation of an employer is not specifically mentioned in
section 8(a)(3),58 courts have attached considerable significance to what
prompts employer action.
The Supreme Court recognized the necessity for anti-union animus
in finding a section 8(a)(3) violation shortly after the NLRA became
law. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 9 and NLRB v. Mackay
50% decline in employer's business, not by union recognition request seven hours prior to layoff);
Tower Paint Investments, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 823 (1972) (discharges necessary to decrease expendi-
tures; not motivated by union activity); Comet Rice Mills Div., Early Cal. Indus., Inc., 195
N.L.R.B. 671 (1972) (discharge of non-senior organizer due to business decline).
53. Neptune Waterbeds, 249 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1980) (employee fired for fighting and threaten-
ing co-workers, not for union activity); Kenai Air Service, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 931 (1978) (permissi-
ble to fire employee who threatened to aid employer's competitor during a strike when employee
was disloyal to employer in the past); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 1043 (1972) (adverse
comments to policyholder and other incidents justified firing).
54. Moody Nursing Home, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 147 (1980) (negligence with patients was
grounds for discharge; discharge not based on union activism); K & B Mounting, Inc., 248
N.L.R.B. 570 (1980) (fourth vehicle accident in five months made discharge of union activist dur-
ing union campaign lawful); Potlatch Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 707 (1978) (employer justified in firing
employee for carelessly driving fork lift truck).
55. West Pak, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1980) (discharge of union supporter for falsifying
cause of collision lawful); Diebold, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 816 (1974) (discharge for fabricating ex-
pense receipts and misappropriating company resources lawful despite fact that employee was
union activist); Allstate Ins. Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 565 (1974) (discharge of insurance adjuster who
made false claim on own policy lawful despite minimal union activity), enforced per curiam, 76
Lab. Cas. 110,714 (2d Cir. 1975); Mission Clay Products Corp., 206 N.L.R.B. 280 (1973) (dis-
charge of union adherent for taking kick-backs on credit card purchases lawful).
56. Dixie Machine Rebuilders, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 881 (1980) (employer lawfully discharged
unionist employee for excessive absences); Proler Int'l Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 676 (1979) (gross ab-
sence justifies firing despite union activity); International Baking Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 230 (1979)
(same); Maryland Baking Co., 229 N.L.R.B. 1087 (1977) (employee legally discharged due to
excessive absenteeism caused by pregnancy).
57. Fikse Bros., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1351 (1978) (discharge for violation of no-smoking rule
held lawful), petition for review denied sub nom. Stephenson v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir.
1980); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 218 (1978) (employee lawfully discharged pursuant
to anti-nepotism rule); Speed Queen, 192 N.L.R.B. 995 (1971) (employee lawfully fired for not
wearing safety glasses) enforced in pertinent part, 469 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1972).
58. The Act itself forbids only discrimination "to encourage or discourage" union member-
ship. See, e.g., Note, Employer Motivation Under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 202,203 (1968). See also notes 1, 23-24supra and accompanying text.
59. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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Radio & Telegraph Co." the Court discarded reliance on a discrimina-
tory impact analysis, emphasizing instead the importance of "anti-
union motivation" in finding a violation.6 In Mackay the employer
hired permanent replacements for striking employees. The Supreme
Court agreed with the Board's finding of unlawful discrimination,62 but
held that employer decisions based on legitimate business reasons do
not violate the Act even though such conduct constitutes discrimination
that discourages union activity.63 Since Mackay, courts and the NLRB
have fluctuated as to which elements must be proven, the burden of
proof, and the type of evidence required to establish a section 8(a)(3)
violation.
In Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB"I the Court took a more expansive
view, holding that motive need not be specifically proven in every case,
but instead can be inferred from the nature of certain kinds of inher-
ently discriminatory conduct. 65 Notably absent, however, were guide-
60. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
61. In Jones & Laughlin the Court said:
The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select
its employees or to discharge them. The employer may not, under cover of that right,
intimidate or coerce its employees with respect to their self-organization and representa-
tion, and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to make its authority a pretext for
interference with the right of discharge when that right is exercised for other reasons
than such intimidation and coercion. The true purpose is the subject of investigation
with full opportunity to show the facts.
301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937). This statement has since been interpreted as requiring the Board to find
"anti-union motivation." In a companion case decided on the same date, Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937), the Court again found a violation of § 8(a)(3) to have been estab-
lished because the "actual reason" for the employee's discharge was union activity. Id at 132.
62. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. at 345-46.
63. Id Hiring permanent replacements for economic strikers is not an unfair labor practice
if it is done for legitimate business reasons. The Court stated that:
[lit does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost
the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers.
And he is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the
election of the latter to resume their employment, in order to create places for them. The
assurance by respondent to those who accepted employment during the strike that if they
so desired their places might be permanent was not an unfair labor practice nor was it
such to reinstate only so many of the strikers as there were vacant places to be filled.
Id (footnote omitted). The Court thus sanctioned a practice that is surely discrimination that
discourages union activity, dealing a severe blow to pro-union activity.
64. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
65. Specific evidence of intent to encourage or discourage union membership or activity is
not an indispensable element of proof of a § 8(a)(3) violation. The Court said that specific proof
of intent is unnecessary where employer conduct inherently encourages or discourages union
membership. The Court justified this approach by referring to it as an application of the common
law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct. Id at 45. A
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lines for determining when there is an occurrence of conduct that
foreseeably or inherently discourages union activity.66
Teamster Local 357 v. NLRB67 presented the question whether a
union hiring hall agreement68 is violative of section 8(a)(3) through its
discriminatory effect on casual employees. While noting that exclusive
hiring halls have a natural tendency to discourage union membership,
the Court held that the "true purpose" or "real motive" in hiring and
firing constitutes the test.69 The encouragement or discouragement
must flow from employer discrimination, which is not inferred unless
disparate treatment of employees is based on their union membership
or activities.7"
presumption of unlawful intent was allowed where the employer's conduct inherently encouraged
or discouraged protected activity. Id at 44-46. This presumption was apparently rebuttable.
When differential treatment was clearly based on union adherence, however, rebuttal seems im-
probable. Id at 55-57 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
66. Consequently, Radio Officers has been cited both for the proposition that improper mo-
tive is necessary under § 8(a)(3) and for the proposition that it is not. See Comment, Proving an
8(a)(3) Violation: The Changing Standard, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 866, 872 (1966), citing Getman,
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CHi. L. Rv.
735, 745 (1965).
67. 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
68. Union operated hiring halls act as a job referral service that receives requests from em-
ployers and provides workers who are qualified and available. Hiring halls permit job hunters to
avoid time-wasting and duplicative job searches and provide employers flexibility into and out of
the product market by relieving them of the responsibility of maintaining a permanent work force.
The union and employer may make the hiring hall "nonexclusive," allowing the employer to
reject persons referred by the union in favor of personnel from other sources. Alternatively, the
hiring hall may be the "exclusive" method of recruitment.
Union control over the referral process provides an opportunity to discriminate invidiously in
favor of union members against non-members. However, exclusive referral by a union hall is not
necessarily an unfair labor practice. "The key issue is whether the hiring hall arrangement, as
written or implemented in practice, works a union induced discrimination which encourages
union membership" in violation of§ 8(a)(3) or § 8(b)(2). See R. GORMAN, supra note 11, at 664-
65; D. LESLIE, LABOR LAW 341 (1979).
69. Teamster Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961). The Court first examined the
legislative history to see if Congress had prohibited hiring halls. Finding no such declaration, the
Court reasoned that exclusive hiring halls could not judicially be declared a per se unfair labor
practice. Id at 673-74. Thus, an inherently discriminatory motive could not be attributed to an
employer for merely setting up such an arrangement. This denied the Board the use of the pre-
sumption announced in Rado Officers, which it had applied. See Comment, supra note 66, at
872-73.
70. This recognizes that no amount of encouragement or discouragement could turn a non-
discriminatory action into a violation of the section. However, differentiation of treatment with-
out sufficient reason will constitute discrimination. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793, 805 (1945).
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The landmark case of NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. 7t estab-
lished a revised test for determining section 8(a)(3) violations. Great
Dane, which is controlling today, concerned denial of vacation pay to
strikers who, because of the strike, failed to work the requisite number
of hours to receive extra benefits. Distilling separate types of employer
conduct from prior cases, Chief Justice Warren established a two-tier
analysis for proving motive. The first category consists of conduct that
is "inherently destructive" of employee section 772 rights to organize.
In this instance the Board may find an unfair labor practice regardless
of evidence that the employer was motivated by business
considerations. 3
The second category consists of conduct that has only a "compara-
tively slight" effect on employee rights.74 Initially the General Counsel
must show "that the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct
which could have adversely affected employee rights to some extent."75
The burden of proof then shifts to the employer to come forward with
"legitimate and substantial" business justifications, because "proof of
motivation is most accessible to him."76 If the employer satisfies this
71. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
72. Section 7 of the NLRA grants employees "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Section 8 of the NLRA declares illegal certain employer
acts, such as restraint, interference or coercion of employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights;
domination of unions; and discrimination in employment so as to discourage union membership.
73. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967). If an employer's conduct
falls in the inherently destructive category, illegal motivation is inferred from the nature of the
discriminatory conduct itself. The inference arises automatically once the prima facie case is es-
tablished. This rule is based on the principle that "some conduct carries with it 'unavoidable
consequences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must have intended' and thus
bears 'its own indicia of intent."' Id at 33, quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221,
228, 231 (1963). If there is no proof of anti-union motivation, the Board is to exercise its duty to
strike the proper balance between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of employee
rights in accord with the Act and its policy. 388 U.S. at 33-34. An unfair labor practice is found if
the harm to employee rights outweighs the purported justifications set forth by the employer.
Because employer conduct is characterized as "inherently destructive" of employee rights, a viola-
tion can be found without specific reference to intent. Further, even though an employer complies
with his affirmative duty to present business justification for his acts, it would be exceedingly
difficult to present a justification sufficiently important to outweigh the harm to employees. See
Comment, Employer Discrimination Under Section 8(a)(3), 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 722, 729-30 (1974).
74. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. at 33-34, quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S.
278, 289 (1965).
75. Id at 34.
76. Id The asserted business justification may not be merely a "pretext" masking the real
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burden, the General Counsel must then prove that the employer was
actually motivated by anti-union animus in order to establish a
violation. 7
Significantly, the Court provided no criteria for determining whether
employer conduct was "inherently destructive" or had only a "compar-
atively slight" impact on employee rights. Nor did the Court address
how the Board should weigh the employer's "legitimate and substan-
tial" reasons against the severity of impact on union activities in "com-
paratively slight" cases.
In the same year Great Dane was decided, the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to resolve these questions in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer
Co." Following the conclusion of a strike, Fleetwood hired new em-
reason for encouragement or discouragement of union activity. If the Board rules that the em-
ployer's explanation or justification is not "legitimate and substantial," it may find a § 8(a)(3)
violation without proceeding further-without categorizing the conduct or requiring proof of ille-
gal intent. See note 29 supra.
Significantly, the shifting burden of proof analysis mandated by the Supreme Court in Great
Dane mirrors Congress' intent that the employer must make the proof. This point was clearly
illuminated by Senator Taft during the floor debate of the LMRA, when in commenting on
amendment of § 10(c) he stated:
The original House provision was that no order of the Board could require the reinstate-
ment of any individual or employee who had been suspended or discharged, unless the
weight of the evidence showed that such individual was not suspended or discharged for
cause. In other words, it was turned around so as to put the entire burden on the em-
ployee to show he was not discharged for cause. Under provision of the conference
report, the employer has to make the proof. That is the present rule and the present
practice of the Board. The Board will have to determine-and it always has-whether
the discharge was for cause or for union activity, and the preponderance of the evidence
will determine that question.
93 CONG. REc. 6678 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft), reprintedm 1947 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 36, at 1595.
Shifting the burden of proof to the employer after a prima fade case is made puts the burden on
the party most able to produce the desired information. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388
U.S. at 34. See also 7 ALA. L. REy. 183, 186-87 (1955):
A more reasonable solution would be to allow the injured employee. . . to establish a
prima fade case by proving that the acts of the employer tended to encourage or discour-
age union membership. The burden of proof would then shift to the employer to show
that his acts were justified by a bona fide and legitimate motive ... . The difficult
burden of proving the motive would then be on the employer who is, of course, in a
better position to do so.
Id
77. After business justification is presented, illegal intent may be shown affirmatively by di-
rect or circumstantial evidence. See notes 31, 36 supra and accompanying text. For methods to
establish and rebut evidence of hostile motive, see notes 33-57 supra and accompanying text. See
also Comment, supra note 73, at 778.
78. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
Washington University Open Scholarship
926 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:913
ployees instead of reinstating economic strikers.7 9 The Supreme Court
stated that the employer had the burden of showing "legitimate and
substantial" justifications, as under both Great Dane categories."0 The
employer's contention that no jobs were available when the strikers ap-
plied for reinstatement was held not to provide a legitimate and sub-
stantial business justification."1 Consequently, the Court failed to
specify which category of Great Dane was applied. Ambiguous lan-
guage in the opinion seemingly dispenses with the need to characterize
employer conduct as either "inherently destructive" or "comparatively
slight." 2 Moreover, the Court once again failed to specify what consti-
79. A work stoppage is an "economic strike" when striking employees seek improved work-
ing conditions or terms of employment (i.e. higher wages or fringe benefits). An "unfair labor
practice strike" occurs when employees protest an unfair labor practice the employer is accused of
committing. Economic strikers who are replaced during the pendency of a strike are required to
be reinstated only after vacancies occur in their former positions or job classification. In contrast,
unfair labor practice strikers are normally entitled to immediate reinstatement at the termination
of the strike, even though the employer hired replacements. See Comment, supra note 73, at 736
n.60.
80. Under the "inherently destructive" category of Great Dane, the employer is permitted to
offer evidence that his conduct was motivated by business considerations, which is balanced
against the harm to employee organizational rights. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
Similarly, employers whose conduct falls within the "comparatively slight" category have the bur-
den to show legitimate and substantial business justifications once a prima facie case is estab-
lished. See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text. "[U]nless the employer ... can show that
his action was due to 'legitimate and substantial business justification"' an unfair labor practice
under § 8(a)(3) is committed. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967), quoting
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. at 34.
81. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1967). The Court indicated that a
legitimate and substantial justification might exist if economic strikers are replaced during a strike
or if changing business conditions or methods of operation necessitate a change in personnel.
However, neither possible justification existed because the strikers were replaced after the strike
and no change in conditions or methods occurred. Because the employer failed to show a legiti-
mate and substantial business justification, the Court found an unfair labor practice without refer-
ence to inten. Id at 380.
82. Great Dane clearly indicated that the Board is to balance the parties' interests when em-
ployer conduct is labeled "inherently destructive." 388 U.S. at 33. Fleetwood Trailer reiterated
the principle stated in Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 33-34, that the Board is to balance business justifi-
cations against the invasion of employee rights to determine whether the employer's justifications
are legitimate and substantial. 389 U.S. at 378. Great Dane did not, however, authorize use of a
balancing test when employer conduct was labeled "comparatively slight," nor did it preclude
balancing in these cases. 388 U.S. at 34. A careful reading of Fleetwood Trailer indicates the
Court was referring to the "inherently destructive" category when it discussed use of a balancing
test. Nevertheless, courts and commentators have cited this language as eliminating the need to
characterize employer conduct as either "comparatively slight" or "inherently destructive," sug-
gesting no real difference exists between the categories. See NLRB v. Alamo Express, Inc., 430
F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 429 F.2d 1223 (3d Cir.
1970); Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Shieber & Moore, upra note 7, at 14;
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tutes "legitimate and substantial business justifications" in the burden
of proof formulation. In short, a cloud was cast over the proper appli-
cation of the Great Dane test.
Without a definitive statement from the Supreme Court, courts of
appeals and the Board have grappled with ill-defined standards and
competing theories of motivation that have spawned, at the very least,
less than uniform terminology. Enunciation of a causation test that
reconciles agency experience in drawing inferences with Congressional
intent in dual motive cases remains an important concern in federal
labor litigation.
IV. COMPETING STANDARDS OF CAUSATION
A. The "n Part" Test
The "in part" test provides that if a discharge is motivated in part by
an employee's protected activities, the discharge violates the Act de-
spite the presence of a legitimate business reason.83 The "in part" anal-
ysis has taken various forms, utilizing dissimilar terminology while
maintaining the underlying concept." Courts have used the following
terms in dual motivation cases: The "motivating or moving cause";85
the "motivating factor";86 a "substantial cause";87 "in substantial
part";88 and "motivated principally." 89
Under this test, the General Counsel must make an initial showing of
unlawful motive9° by presenting substantial evidence that the discharge
Comment, Employer Motive and 8(a)(3) Violations, 48 B.U. L. REv. 142, 147 (1968). In fact, the
Court's careful distinction between the two categories indicates that balancing is not to occur in
"comparatively slight" cases, highlighting an important difference between the two categories of
employer conduct. See notes 160-70 infra and accompanying text.
83. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1084 (1980).
84. Much of the confusion among the circuit courts of appeals is caused by their use of incon-
sistent terminology. Courts often employ terminology that does not accurately describe the causa-
tion test implemented. For example, use of the term "a substantial cause," see note 87 infra, does
not clearly indicate that the court is applying the "in part" test. Elimination of the terminology
described in notes 85-89 infra was urged by the NLRB in Wright Line. See generally notes 131-33
mfra and accompanying text.
85. Bankers Warehouse Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1197 (1964).
86. Tursair Fueling, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 270, 271 n.2 (1965).
87. Broyhill Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 288, 296 (1974).
88. Central Casket Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 362, 362 (1976).
89. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 713, 717 (1977).
90. The burden of making a prima facie case is always on the General Counsel. See notes
33-36 supra and accompanying text.
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was partly motivated by union activity.9' Noncoercive expressions of
union hostility,92 commission of other unfair labor practices, 93 postdis-
charge declarations,94 inconsistent application of employment poli-
cies, 95 and several explanations for discharge96 often serve in various
combinations to create an irrebuttable basis for finding a partially dis-
criminatory motive. 97 The Board can easily find an unfair labor prac-
tice unless the employer has little or no knowledge of the dischargee's
91. See note 36supra for a discussion of the § 10(c) amendment to the LMRA implementing
the substantial evidence standard of review.
Speaking on the Senate floor, Senator Taft argued that the amendment was necessary because
the "supported by evidence" standard practically precluded reviewing courts from reversing
Board decisions. He contended that the amendment did not give courts of appeals review powers
coextensive with powers to review district court opinions, but nevertheless gave them greater op-
portunity to reverse "obviously unjust" Board decisions. 93 CONG. REc. 3839 (1947) (remarks of
Sen. Taft).
92. See, e.g., Metal Cutting Tools, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 536, 539, 542 (1971) (unlawful dis-
charge associated with employer's lawful anti-union letters to employees); Bob White Target Co.,
189 N.L.R.B. 913, 917 (1971) (noncoercive expressions of anti-union animus significant in deter-
mining employer's motivations), enforcement deniedsub. nom. Cannady v. NLRB, 466 F.2d. 583
(10th Cir. 1972). The Board's continued use of noncoercive statements of union hostility is sur-
prising in fight of § 8(c) of the NLRA, which expressly prohibits use of such statements as evi-
dence of unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976); see H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist
Sess. 45 (1947), reprinted in 1947 LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 36, at 292, 299.
93. See, ag., Leon Ferenbach, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 373 (1974) (anti-union animus with respect
to discharge substantiated by contemporaneous § 8(a)(1) violations); Ace Tool Eng'r Co., 207
N.L.R.B. 104, 105-06 (1973) (employer's previous unfair labor practices considered relevant in
determining motivation underlying discharge). Each discriminatory discharge allegation, how-
ever, requires an independent showing of motive. Unless coercive conduct is directed specifically
at the employee alleging discrimination, other violations are indicative of unlawful conduct but
not unlawful motive. See NLRB v. MaGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1956) (finding of coin-
cidental § 8(a)(1) violation does not, without more, make a discharge unlawful or supply a
motive).
94. See, eg., Fred Stark, 213 N.L.R.B. 209, 212 (1974) (statement of employer, four days
after discharge, that employees were discharged because they had joined union relevant to identi-
fication of employer motivation); Loray Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 557, 575 (1970) (employer's state-
ment to union members on day following discharge that there were "less people in here today than
was in here yesterday" considered indicative of animus with respect to discharge).
95. See, eg., Sinclair & Valentine Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 1043, 1045 (1976) (reasons for dis-
charges termed pretextual when employer claimed discharge effected for failure to report to work;
evidence showed that company had policy of permitting four days off without explanation), en-
forcement denied, 549 F.2d 1183 (8th Cir. 1977); Maple City Stamping Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 743, 743
(1972) (employer's claim that discharges were based on lack of work considered pretext because
employer usually assigned employees to maintenance work during slack periods).
96. See, e.g., Warren Chateau Hall, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 351, 352 (1974) (employer's explana-
tion that employees reported to work when unauthorized discounted because supervisor signed
time cards; explanation that part-time help not wanted discredited because part-time employee
subsequently hired).
97. See DuRoss, supra note 36, at 1128-30 & nn.93-98.
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pro-union activity9" or no evidence of anti-union animus can be shown.
The "in part" test strikes a balance in favor of the employees' right to
participate in protected activities free from adverse repercussions. This
advantage is premised on the ground that Congress, in recognizing the
superior bargaining power of the employer, enacted federal labor law
with a balance in favor of the employee.99 Consequently, criticism of
the "in part" test focuses on its alleged inability to accommodate the
legitimate competing interests."° For once hostility toward protected
rights is found, the "in part" analysis is satisfied, and the employer's
plea of legitimate justification is of no consequence.
Recently, the National Labor Relations Board rejected the partial
motive standard in section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases.' 0 ' The "in part"
test, however, is currently applied by many circuit courts of appeals. 10 2
B. The "Dominant Motive" Test
The "dominant motive" test provides that when both a proper and
improper motive for discharge are alleged, the General Counsel must
establish that but for the involvement in protected activity the dis-
charge would not have occurred. 0 3 Under this test, section 8(a)(3) is
not violated unless anti-union animus is the dominant factor in the em-
ployer's motivation, even if the employer is partially motivated by hos-
tile intent. 104
The earliest advocate of the "dominant motive" test was the First
Circuit. This court originally disagreed with the Board's "in part"
98. See, e-g., Diana Shops, 170 N.L.R.B. 698 (1968); Ottaway Newspapers-Radio, Inc., 169
N.L.R.B. 1129 (1968); Atlantic Metal Prods. Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 919 (1966); Klate Holt Co., 161
N.L.R.B. 1606 (1966).
99. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245, 1265 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thornberry, J., con-
curring). See notes 139-143 infra and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1084 (1980).
101. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), represented an important change in Board pol-
icy, abandoning the "in part" test in favor of a causation test based on Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See notes 112-24, 145 infra and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Nacker Packing Co. v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 456, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1980); Edgewood
Nursing Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Gogin, 575 F.2d 596 (7th
Cir. 1978); Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir. 1977); Sweeney & Co.
v. NLRB, 437 F.2d 1127, 1133 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Adam Loos Boiler Works Co., 435 F.2d
707 (6th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Midtown Serv. Co., 425 F.2d 665, 670 (2d Cir. 1970).
103. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1085 (1980).
104. See Wolly, "What Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought?", 41 Omio ST. L.J. 385, 396-97 & n.82
(1980).
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analysis in NLRB v. Whitten Machine Works"I and, in 1963, formally
initiated the "dominant motive," or "but for," test in NLRB v. Lowell
Sun Publishing Co. 106 Fundamental to the court's rejection was the
view that the "in part" test ignored the legitimate business reason of the
employer and placed union activists in an unassailable position once
anti-union animus had been established. 107 To redress this imbalance,
the "dominant motive" test requires that when good cause for dis-
charge appears, the burden is on the Board not simply to discover some
evidence of improper motive, but to find an affirmative and persuasive
reason why the employer rejected the good cause and chose an imper-
missible one.'0 8  The mere existence of anti-union animus is not
enough.
The "dominant motive" test strikes a balance in favor of employers'
rights to maintain control over their work force. This preference is
based on Congress' purported desire to impinge on management con-
trol only when discriminatory employment practices are intended to re-
105. 204 F.2d 883 (Ist Cir. 1953).
106. 320 F.2d 835, 842 (1st Cir. 1963).
107. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1084 (1980). The First Circuit's refusal to employ the
partial motive test has led to a conffict throughout the circuits over which test to apply in dual
motive cases. Joining the First Circuit is the Ninth Circuit. See NLRB v. Sacramento Clinical
Laboratory, Inc., 623 F.2d 110, 113 (9th Cir. 1980) (when there are two motives for the employer's
action, the better rule is that the improper motive must be shown to have been the dominant one).
Accord, NLRB v. Adams Delivery Serv., Inc., 623 F.2d 96, 99 (9th Cir. 1980); L'Eggs Prod. Inc. v.
NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1980); Stephenson v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 1210, 1213 (9th
Cir. 1980). The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits apply the "in
part" test. See Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 27 (7th Cir. 1980) (court explicitly
rejects "dominant motive" test in favor of "in part" test); Chromalloy Mining & Minerals v.
NLRB, 620 F.2d 1120, 1127 (5th Cir. 1980) (discharge is unlawful even if partially motivated by
employee protected activity); Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 126 (6th Cir. 1980)
(violation occurs if discharge motivated in part by protected activity); Waterbury Community
Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1978) (it must be shown that discharge was
motivated at least partially by anti-union considerations); Edgewood Nursing Center, Inc. v.
NLRB, 581 F.2d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 1978) (when two or more motives behind discharge, unfair
labor practice committed if action partially motivated by protected activity); M.S.P. Indus., Inc. v.
NLRB, 568 F.2d 166, 173-74 (10th Cir. 1977); Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568,
570 (4th Cir. 1977) (circuit applies in part test). The District of Columbia Circuit applies both the
"dominant motive" and "in part" tests. Compare Midwest Regional Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d
434, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1977) with Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Eighth
Circuit does not characterize dual motive discharges as such and has taken varying approaches to
discriminatory discharge cases. See, e.g., Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 791, 799
(8th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Melrose Processing Co., 351 F.2d 693, 698-99 (8th Cir. 1965); NLRB v.
Des Moines Foods, Inc., 296 F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir. 1961).
108. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 595, 602 (1st Cir. 1979). See generally DuRoss,
supra note 36.
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ward or penalize organizational activity,10 9 regardless of the actual
effect of management's exercise of control.
The "dominant motive" test is criticized for confficting with Con-
gress' specified process of shifting the burden of proof to the employer
after evidence of discriminatory intent is shown.110 Requiring the Gen-
eral Counsel to show that the employer's dominant purpose was dis-
criminatory is an unrealistic burden, as the employer is more capable
of producing evidence regarding intent.
C. The Mt. Healthy Test
As the two preceding sections demonstrate, analysis of which causa-
tion test is proper for adjudicating dual motive cases finds the "in part"
test standing at one extreme and the "dominant motive" test at the
other. The Supreme Court has not attempted to formulate standards of
review for dual motive discharges since Great Dane in 1967. While the
questions left unanswered in Great Dane will not be definitively re-
solved until the Court decides a section 8(a)(3) dual motive case, the
causation test propounded in Mt. Healthy Board of Education v.
Doyle112 may accurately foreshadow the Court's resolution of this
schism.
The Mt. Healthy case arose when Doyle, an untenured teacher,
brought suit against the Mt. Healthy School Board alleging discrimina-
tion in the refusal to renew his contract." 3 Doyle, upon request, re-
ceived a termination letter that set forth two reasons for the decision." 4
First, the board claimed Doyle used obscene language and gestures in
the school cafeteria."I5 Second, the board cited Doyle's disclosure of a
change in the school's dress code to a local radio station. 1 6 Doyle's
suit alleged that the refusal to renew his contract violated his rights
109. See DuRoss, supra note 36, at 1116.
110. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1087 (1980); note 76 spra and accompanying text.
i. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1087 (1980). But see DuRoss, supra note 36, at 1126-28
(shifting burden of proof applied in Great Dane should have no application to most dual-motive
discharges: to redress the inequalities of in part test, burden of proving anti-union motive should
be part of Board's threshold showing, and the Board must show the motive was dominant to
establish a statutory violation).
112. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
113. Id at 276.
114. Id at 282-83.
115. Id
116. Id Doyle asserted that his telephone call to the radio station was clearly protected con-
duct under the First Amendment.
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under the first and fourteenth amendments. " 7 The district court found
in Doyle's favor, holding that protected activity played a "substantial
part" in the school board's decision.1 8 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that "substantial evidence"
supported the trial court's finding that the school board was motivated
"at least in part" by Doyle's activity." 9
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The Court agreed that
Doyle's conduct was protected, but rejected both the district court's
substantial motive test and the Sixth Circuit's partial motive test.' 20
The Court stated that even if protected conduct played a part, "sub-
stantial" or otherwise, in the decision to discipline or discharge, a con-
stitutional violation could be avoided only if the same decision would
have been reached absent an occurrence of protected activity.' 2 1 A de-
cision not to rehire should not "place an employee in a better position
as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he
would have occupied had he done nothing."'122 Further, an employer
should be able to evaluate an employee's performance and decide not
to rehire on the basis of the work record, despite the presence of pro-
tected conduct that reinforces the employer's decision.123
The Court then set forth a two-part test applicable in dual motive
contexts. Initially, the employee must establish that the protected con-
duct is a "substantial" or "motivating" factor. If this is shown, the bur-
den shifts to the employer to demonstrate that he would have reached
the same decision absent the protected conduct.' 24
Although Mt. Healthy does not specify the extent to which an em-
ployer must be influenced by protected activity before an employment
decision is rendered invalid, a companion case sheds light on the issue.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. , 125 decided the same day as Mt. Healthy, the Court considered a
race-based challenge under the Fair Housing Act to a village's denial of
117. Id at 276.
118. I d at 283.
119. Id at 276.
120. Id at 284.
121. Id at 287.
122. Id at 285.
123. Id at 286.
124. Id at 287 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977)).
125. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
[Vol. 59:913
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a rezoning proposal that would have permitted multiple family hous-
ing. 126 The majority opinion by Justice Powell ruled that plaintiffs did
not carry their burden of proving that discrimination was a motivating
factor in the Village's decision.' 27 Relying on the Mt. Healthy test, the
Court stated that if the Village was partially motivated by a racially
discriminatory purpose the decision would not have been invalidated.
Instead such proof would have shifted to the Village the burden of es-
tablishing that the same decision would have resulted even if the im-
permissible purpose was not considered.' 28  Finally, the Court
recognized that efforts to determine the "dominant" or primary motive
in dual motive situations are usually unavailing.
29
V. APPLICABILITY OF M. HA4LTHY TO THE NLRA
The National Labor Relations Board has recently indicated that the
Mt. Healthy case is consistent with the NLRB decision-making process,
which traditionally inquires whether protected activity played a role in
an employer's decision and whether the employer could assert a legiti-
mate business reason to negate the showing of prohibited motivation.
In Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc. ' 30 the Board adopted
the Mt. Healthy analysis to relieve some of the confusion associated
with dual motive cases.' 3' Emphasizing a desire to set forth explicitly
the method to be used in drawing inferences and conclusions from the
evidence presented, the Board announced its abandonment of the "in
part" terminology.' 32 Instead, the Board applied a precise analytical
framework to determine whether a prima facie case was established
and, if so, whether the respondent carried its burden to establish that its
decision was not affected by the protected conduct.' 33
126. id at 254.
127. Id at 270.
128. Id at 270-71 n.21.
129. Id at 265.
130. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
131. Id at 1083. See notes 13-16, 102 supra.
132. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083, 1087 (1980). See Herman Bros., Inc., 252
N.L.R.B. No. 121, 105 L.R.R.M. 1374 (Sept. 30, 1980).
133. In the Board's opinion, the major contribution of Wright Line is that it will set forth more
clearly the burden on each party and provide the Board with an analytical framework within
which to discuss the extent to which the parties have carried their respective burdens. It is also
hoped that the case will lay to rest the Board's critics' concerns over perceived ambiguity in their
analytical capability. Finally, it is hoped that the Wright Line test will impose greater intellectual
rigor on the Board's analysis so that litigants and courts of appeals will have greater confidence
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The two-part Wright Line analysis requires that the General Counsel
initially establish a prima facie case by showing that the protected con-
duct was a "motivating" or "substantial" factor in the employer's deci-
sion.1 34 The burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate as an
affirmative defense that his decision would have been the same absent
any protected conduct. 35 If the employer fails to establish this by a
preponderance of the evidence 136 the General Counsel will prevail, re-
gardless of the quantum of unlawful motivation involved. 137 If the em-
ployer establishes an affirmative defense, no unfair labor practice is
committed.138
and understanding of the process utilized by the Board in adjudicating unfair labor practice cases.
See Truesdale address, supra note 28, at 148-49.
134. The General Counsel must seek to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in both
pretext and dual motivation cases. The "absence of any legitimate basis" for the employer's ac-
tion or a showing of disparate treatment regarding the action may form part of the General Coun-
sel's affimative case. See text of Memorandum #80-58 by NLRB General Counsel William A.
Lubbers, Nov. 4, 1980, [1980] 105 LAB. REI. REP. (BNA) 245, 246 [hereinafter cited as Memoran-
dum]. See also Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1966).
135. It is important to note that the employer must show that the same decision wouldhave
been made in the absence of protected activity. A showing that the same decision wouldhave been
justfied or couldhave been made will not be sufficient to establish the affirmative defense. Memo-
randum, supra note 134, at 246 n.5.
The shifting burden requirement is the most apparent distinction between the Mi. Healthy-
Wright Line test and the "dominant motive" test, which requires the General Counsel to show that
the employer's action would not have taken place absent the protected activity. Id at 246 n.2.
However, "the shifting of burdens does not undermine the established concept that the General
Counsel must establish an unfair labor practice by a preponderance of the evidence." Wright
Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 n.l 1 (1980). The shifting burden requires the employer to establish
an affirmative defense to overcome the prima facie case. This requirement does not shift the
ultimate burden. Id
136. See note 91 supra.
137. Memorandum, supra note 134, at 246.
138. Interpreting the Board's decision in Wright Line for the regional offices, the General
Counsel indicates that an opportunity exists to rebut the affirmative defense with further evidence
of unlawful motivation. Memorandum, supra note 134, at 246. The Board's decision did not
provide for such rebuttal. See notes 175-76 infra and accompanying text.
Following Wright Line the Board has meticulously adhered to these standards. See Red Ball
Motor Freight, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 111, 106 L.R.R.M. 1033, 1034 (Dec. 19, 1980) (Wright Line
applied; after prima facie case made out, burden shifted to employer to show discharge would
have occurred even in absence of concerted protected activities); United Broadcasting Co., 253
N.L.R.B. No. 102, 106 L.R.R.M. 1005 (Dec. 10, 1980) (under Wright Line, no unfair labor practice
when General Counsel fails to make prima facie showing that protected conduct was a motivating
factor in discharge decision); Russ Togs, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 99, 106 L.R.R.M. 1067 (Dec. 15,
1980) (layoff of two employees violated § 8(a)(3) under Wright Line analysis); Joshua's, Inc., 253
N.L.R.B. No. 82, 106 L.R.R.M. 1035 (Dec. 5, 1980) (finding of unfair labor practice by Adminis-
trative Law Judge upheld because employer failed to demonstrate it would have taken same ac-
tion in absence of opposition to the union); Weather Tamer, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 105
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/12
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Because the M. Healthy test was pronounced in a first amendment
case, some critics believe it inapplicable to section 8(a)(3) cases. Circuit
Judge Thornberry, concurring in Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 139 ar-
gued that the judiciary has greater freedom to balance competing inter-
ests in a constitutional context than under the NLRA, in which
Congress has struck a balance favoring employees. 4 ' This analysis is
inapposite for three reasons. First, the Act was not passed to encourage
pro-union activity. While Congress did intend to equalize the negotiat-
ing capabilities of employees and employers, it did so by protecting the
collective bargaining process, which is furthered by section 8(a)(3). 14 '
Second, the M. Healthy test does not strike a balance favoring employ-
ers. Rather, it is designed to preclude employees from obtaining relief
to which they otherwise are not entitled simply because organizational
activity was involved.'4 2 Finally, a test that is adequate to protect first
amendment rights is undoubtedly adequate to protect organizational
rights.'
4 3
VI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Assuming that the Mt. Healthy test is applicable to dual motive dis-
charges under section 8(a)(3), it follows that the "in part" test, which is
L.R.R.M. 1569 (Nov. 14, 1980) (fact that employer waged vigorous campaign against union and
decided to close plant after union won election undermined employer's explanation that he would
have taken same action in absence of union activity); Valley Cabinet & Mfg., Inc., 253 N.L.R.B.
No. 8, 105 L.R.R.M. 1467 (Oct. 21, 1980) (employer violates § 8(a)(3) by laying off employee);
Motor Convoy, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 105 L.R.R.M. 1519 (Sept. 30, 1980) (motivating factor
behind employee discharge was filing of numerous grievances, not accident in which cargo dam-
aged); United Parcel Serv., Inc. 252 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 105 L.R.R.M. 1484 (Sept. 30, 1980) (em-
ployer failed to rebut showing of General Counsel that discharge unlawfully motivated due to
abrupt and harsh discipline); Herman Bros., Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 105 L.R.R.M. 1374 (Sept.
30, 1980) (unfair labor practice upheld where employer did not present persuasive evidence that
discharge would not occur in absence of protected activity).
Since Wright Line was announced in August, 1980, it has been recognized by the Third and
Fourth Circuits. See NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., No. 80-1617 (3d Cir. 1981); NLRB v.
Bums Motor Freight, Inc., 635 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1980).
139. 566 F.2d 1245, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thornberry, J., concurring).
140. Id at 1265. Judge Thornberry believes this balance was struck in recognition of the
superior bargaining position of the employer. Id
141. See DuRoss, supra note 36, at 115-16.
142. Id See Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977) (constitutional
right sufficiently vindicated if "an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not
engaged in the [protected] conduct").
143. Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1978).
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satisfied by a showing of improper motive, is rejected. 1" The "in part"
test is conceptually at odds with the principle that management, as the
master of its own business affairs, can discharge employees for good
cause or no cause at all,'45 provided such action is not based on anti-
union animus. The conflict exists because the employer's legitimate
justification is ignored when an improper reason for discharge exists.
The employer's recognized right to enforce company rules should not
be rendered inconsequential because it conflicts with an employee's
right to participate in protected activities without adverse repercus-
sions.1 46 Thus, an "in part" test, while accurate to a certain degree, is
incomplete, for it fails to provide employers with a fair opportunity to
assert discharge for cause when union activists are terminated.
The "dominant motive" test should also be rejected in light of Mt.
Healthy, despite their apparent similarity. 47 While both Mt. Healthy
and the "dominant motive" test reject an "in part" analysis and require
proof of how the employer would have acted in the absence of pro-
tected activity, the tests place the burden of proof on different par-
ties. 148 Under the "dominant motive" test, the General Counsel must
make a prima facie showing of unlawful motive, as well as rebut an
employer asserted defense by demonstrating that the discharge would
not have taken place but for the employees' protected activities. 149
Under the Mt. Healthy test, however, once the General Counsel estab-
lishes a prima facie case of employer reliance on protected activity, the
burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the same decision
would have been made in the absence of protected activity.150 This
distinction is crucial, as allocation of the burden of proof can be
144. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1087 (1980).
145. See, e.g., NLRB v. Computed Time Corp., 587 F.2d 790, 795 (5th Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Nabors, 196 F.2d 272, 275 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952).
146. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
147. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1087-88 (1980).
148. Id See notes 110-11, 135 supra and accompanying text.
149. The First Circuit may have recently modified its view, retreating from its "but for" termi-
nology. In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 1067, 1073 (1st Cir. 1979), and NLRB v.
Eastern Smelting and Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 671 (Ist Cir. 1979), the First Circuit stated that
once some improper motivation is shown, the burden is on the employer to prove that it had a
good reason for the discharge and that the discharge, would have occurred in the absence of the
improper reason. This formulation, like the Board's, puts the burden of proving the employer's
motives on the employer and removes much of the controversy between the Board and that
circuit.
150. See notes 76, 124, 135 supra and accompanying text.
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determinative.1 51
Keeping the burden on the General Counsel is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in Great Dane152 and places the employer in
an inordinately advantageous position. Instead, the Board should re-
quire employers to supply proof of motive, affording them the opportu-
nity to justify their business decision. Requiring the employer to justify
his business decision best advances the fundamental objectives articu-
lated by Congress, as the employer is the party with best access to proof
of motivation. 153
The "dominant motive" test is further undermined by the Arlington
Heights decision.' 54 The Court explicitly eschewed the dominant mo-
tive analysis, stating it is practically impossible to examine a dual mo-
tive decision and definitively ascertain the "dominant" or "primary"
purpose.155
In reconciling the Mt. Healthy test with established labor law princi-
ples, it is important to note that neither Mt. Healthy nor Wright Line
makes reference to the two prong analysis of Great Dane. Mt. Healthy
and Wright Line are nevertheless consistent with Great Dane and rep-
resent a refinement of the method for adjudicating dual motive dis-
charges under the NLRA.
Great Dane established "inherently destructive" and "comparatively
slight" categories of employer conduct without describing how to make
the classification. 5 6 Under the first category, "inherently destructive"
conduct supports the finding of an unfair labor practice without specific
reference to intent.'57 Although the employer is afforded the opportu-
nity to present a business justification for his conduct, the Board may
balance this justification against the harm to employee rights and still
find an unfair labor practice.' 58
The Mt. Healthy- Wright Line analysis should not apply to "inher-
ently destructive" cases. First, resolution of these cases does not turn
151. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1087 (1980).
152. See notes 76, 135 supra and accompanying text.
153. Id
154. See notes 125-29 supra and accompanying text.
155. See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
156. Apparently, categorization of employer conduct according to the fact pattern is accom-
plished through policy determinations made by the Board on a case-by-case basis. See Comment,
supra note 73, at 777.
157. See notes 73, 81 supra and accompanying text.
158. Id
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on motive. t59 The impact on organizational activity may be so severe
that no employer justification could outweigh the employee harm. 16
Second, Wright Line is not a balancing test. The essence of the Wright
Line test is its precise analytical framework, which is not susceptible to
loose application.' 6' Wright Line does not provide the flexibility al-
lowed by the Supreme Court under the "inherently destructive"
category.'
62
Under the second category, when employer conduct causes "compar-
atively slight" harm to organizational activity, the General Counsel is
required to establish a prima facie case by showing the employer's dis-
criminatory conduct could have had an adverse affect on employee
rights to some extent.' 63 Once a prima facie case is established, the
burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that the discharge was
motivated by "legitimate and substantial" business justifications.'" If
the employer successfully rebuts the inference of illegal motivation, the
burden shifts back to the General Counsel, who must affirmatively
prove anti-union motivation through additional evidence. 65
The Mt. Healthy- Wright Line analysis applies to "comparatively
slight" cases, which comprise the overwhelming majority of section
159. See Memorandum, supra note 134, at 247. Again, an unfair labor practice may be found
under the inherently destructive category without regard to intent. See note 157 supra and accom-
panying text.
160. See note 73 supra.
161. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980). See note 133 supra and accompanying
text.
162. The Supreme Court expressly indicated that balancing occurs under the inherently de-
structive category. See notes 73, 80 supra. The Court reserved the possibility of holding that a
business justification offered in this category might substantiate employer conduct despite its in-
herently destructive nature. See note 73 supra. If a balancing test is also applied when employer
conduct is comparatively slight (the Wright Line analysis applies to these cases-see note 166 infra
and accompanying text), the Great Dane Court's careful distinction between the two categories of
employer conduct becomes a distinction without a difference because the rules applicable to the
two categories become identical. In both cases a balancing test would apply to determine the
legitimacy and substantiality of the employer's interest against the interference with employee
rights. For the distinction to be meaningful, balancing should occur only when employer conduct
is inherently destructive. Otherwise, the Board should look solely at the employer's business justi-
fications without reference to the amount of interference with employee rights to see if the justifi-
cations are legitimate and substantial. A balancing process should not be allowed to blur the
precise burdens of proof and steps of analysis required to fairly adjudicate "comparatively slight"
cases. Wright Line's formal framework provides the clarity that § 8(a)(3) dual motive cases de-
mand. See Shieber & Moore, supra note 7, at 13; Comment, supra note 82, at 147-48.
163. See notes 33-48, 75 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 73, 76, 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/12
DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGES
8(a)(3) discriminatory discharges.166 The Mt. Healthy test embraced in
Wright Line accomplishes the "delicate task"' 67 of providing a proce-
dure through which the interests of employees in concerted activity can
be "compared" to the interests of the employer in operating his busi-
ness consistent with Supreme Court decisions and the policy of the
NLRA. The employee's rights are safeguarded because, initially, the
General Counsel is required to show only that protected activities were
a factor, "substantial" or "motivating," in the employer's decision to
engage in discriminatory conduct. 6 ' Consistent with Great Dane, if
the General Counsel is unable to meet this minimal requirement, no
unfair labor practice is found.'69
If a prima facie case is established, the burden of proof shifts to the
employer to show that absent the protected conduct, he would have
reached the same decision.' 70 This is the "legitimate and substantial"
business justification requirement of Great Dane, articulated as a clear,
practical test. Under Great Dane, no unfair labor practice is committed
if, despite knowledge by the employer of protected conduct 17 1 and ac-
tion by the employer that discourages union activity, 172 the employer
was motivated by "legitimate objectives."' 173  Simply stated, Wright
Line requires an employer to prove that the same decision would have
been reached "anyway."' 174 It is irrelevant that protected activity is a
"dominant or primary" factor or that illegal motivation is "a part" of
the decision. If the employer fails to establish the affirmative defense,
the General Counsel prevails, regardless of the quantum of unlawful
166. Only two cases appear to follow the "inherently destructive" language of Great Dane.
See NLRB v. Midwest Hangers Co. & Liberty Eng'r Corp., 474 F.2d 1155, 1158 (8th Cir.) (dis-
charge of large number of employees including union organizers during organizational campaign
held "inherently destructive of employee interests," thus putting burden on employer to justify its
actions), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973); NLRB v. Entwhistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (4th
Cir. 1941) (discriminatory discharge of employee because of union affiliation goes to the "very
heart of the Act").
167. NLRB v. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221, 229 (1963).
168. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
169. See notes 33-48, 75 supra and accompanying text.
170. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
171. Knowledge is inferred through either direct or substantial evidence. See notes 31, 33-34,
36 .upra and accompanying text.
172. See notes 37-48, 63 supra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 49-57, 73, 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
174. Former NLRB member Truesdale characterized the M. Healthy-Wright Line test as an
"anyway" test in comparison to the First Circuit's "but for" test. See Truesdale address, supra
note 28, at 148.
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motivation involved. 75 If the employer establishes the defense, an un-
fair labor practice has not been committed.1 76
VII. CONCLUSION
The applicability of the Mt. Healthy test to the NLRA depends on its
compatibility with Congressional intent and established labor law prin-
ciples and the extent to which the test accommodates management em-
ployment prerogatives and union organizing rights.177  Section 8(a)(3)
should not prevent an employer from discharging an employee who
lacks skill or ability, nor should it require hiring an incompetent em-
ployee; the section, however, should prevent an employer from making
discharge decisions on the basis of union activity or membership. 7 8 It
is therefore necessary that the General Counsel be required to establish
anti-union animus as the motivating factor for the employer's conduct
in order to prove a violation. 179
Congress intended motive to be the critical factor and placed the re-
sponsibility of evaluating the competing interests on the Labor Board.
It is therefore proper that the forum closest to the dispute in both expe-
175. See note 137 supra and accompanying text. An affirmative defense is not established
unless the employer has a legitimate and substantial business justification.
176. See note 138 supra and accompanying text. This step of the Wright Line analysis is
poorly defined. Prior to shifting the burden of proof back to the General Counsel, the employer
must successfully establish his affirmative defense. This entails proving a legitimate and substan-
tial business justification or, as stated in note 174 supra, that the employer would have reached the
same decision "anyway." The General Counsel, in his memorandum to regional offices, indicated
that "it would appear" the General Counsel presenting the case has an opportunity to rebut the
affirmative defense through additional evidence of hostile motivation. See Memorandum, jupra
note 134, at 246. However, the Board in Wright Line made no provision for such rebuttal. The
General Counsel's assertion that rebuttal is available implies that a legitimate and substantial
business justification can co-exist with a high quantum of unlawful motivation. Rather than re-
quire the Board subjectively to decide what amount of unlawful motivation outweighs the em-
ployer's legitimate business decision through an imprecise balancing process, establishing the
affirmative defense should conclusively exonerate an employer from the unfair labor practice
charge.
177. BufSc. DuRoss, supra note 36, at 1117, 1128 (recognizing importance of both manage-
ment prerogatives and union organizing rights, but implying that exercise of management discre-
tion is far more important).
178. 78 CONG. REC. 10560 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Walsh).
179. Congressional debate on § 8(a)(3) emphasized that it was necessary to establish anti-
union animus as the motivating factor for the employer's conduct in order to prove a violation.
See 79 CONG. REc. 2333 (1935), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 2433. Put
another way, it is the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act to guarantee that business
decisions not be the product of anti-union motivation. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d
595, 603 (Ist Cir. 1979).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/12
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rience and expertise administer a uniform test that provides a precise
framework for analyzing the complex circumstances that characterize
dual motive discharges. The Supreme Court should formally recognize
the Mt. Healthy- Wright Line test as the correct standard to apply in
adjudicating discriminatory discharge claims. This approach should
then be adopted uniformly by the circuit courts of appeals, ending the
confusion that currently exists on this point of law.
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